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The Federalism of Freedom
,By CHESTER JAMES ANTIEAU*
Is there a federal factor in the delimitation of state competence
to abridge freedom of expression, as necessary of comprehension
and consideration as in the determination of permissible state
power over interstate commerce? Should the states have any
power to censor, control or punish expressions and communica-
tions the ideational content of which is of sole or even primary
concern to the Nation? Have courts, as a matter of fact in de-
lineating state competence in this area, recognized the impropriety
of state negation of expression on matters of national concern?
Is such a standard more serviceable to a federal society than cus-
tomary criteria imposed equally and carelessly as the determinants
of both federal and state powers? These questions have seldom
been asked, and never satisfactorily answered. To this author the
queries are indisputably relevant, and adequate answers indis-
pensable to a proper judicial limitation of freedom of expression
in our federal democracy.
I. Should there be any power in the states to abridge that
freedom of communication that concerns matters either of national
legislation or national significance?
An inherent right of national citizenship is the right to par-
ticipate in the government of the nation and to discuss free from
interference by the states and municipalities all issues and prob-
lems facing the national government. This right, furthermore,
is in the United States in no way dependent upon the Fourteenth
Amendment and necessarily existed from the formation of the
federal government. AS early as 1857, in the Dred Scott case, the
United States Supreme Court, in an opinion by Mr. Chief Justice
Taney, recognized as clearly distinct from the rights of state
citizenship, "the rights of citizenship as a member of the Union."1
And, in 1868, prior to the adoption of of the Fourteenth Amend-
B.S., M.S., Detroit Institute of Technology; J.D., Detroit College of Law;
LL.M., S.J.D., University of Michigan. Professor of Law, Detroit College of Law,
130 E. Elizabeth St., Detroit, Michigan.
'Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393, 60 U. S. 691, 700 (1857).
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ment, the same Court could describe as "neither novel nor unsup-
ported by authority" both its decision that a national citizen can
concern himself with national affairs, and its conviction that "No
power can exist in a state to obstruct this right which would not
'enable it to defeat the purpose for which the government was
established." 2 Also apposite is the language of Mr. Justice Roberts
in Hague v. C. I. 0. "Prior to the Civil War," he writes, "there
was confusion and debate as to the relation between United States
citizenship and state citizenship." Then he adds: "Beyond dis-
pute, citizenship of the United States, as such, existed." 3
Surely the national right recognized above includes the free-
dom to discuss, sans state interference, all issues facing the nation.
Mr. Justice Brandeis cogently stated: "The right to speak freely
concerning functions of the Federal government is a privilege or
immunity of every citizen of the United States, which, even be-
fore the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, a state was
powerless to curtail.... The right of a citizen of the United States
to take part, for his own or the country's benefit, in the making
of Federal laws and in the conduct of the government, necessarily
includes the right to speak or write about them; to endeavor to
make his own opinion concerning laws existing or contemplated
prevail; and, to this end, to teach the truth as he sees it .... Con-
gress, being charged with responsibility for these functions of gov-
ernment (defending the country and raising armed forces), must
determine whether a paramount interest of the nation demands
that free discussion in relation to them should be curtailed. No
state may trench upon its province."'4
No specific national constitutional provision is necessary, then,
to acknowledge a national citizenship or the attendant inherent
rights of national citizenship. Of course, in the United States, ex-
press constitutional recognition does exist in the privileges and
immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The very lan-
guage of the Amendment is an open admission of a national
citizenship distinct from state citizenship. "Thenceforward," writes
Mr. Justice Roberts, "citizenship of the United States became
primary and citizenship of a state secondary."5 To this author it
'Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35, 44, 18 L. Ed. 745, 747 (1868).
'Hague v. C. 1. 0., 307 U. S. 496, 509 (1939).
'Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U. S. 325, 336-339 (1920) (dissenting).
" Hague v. C. 1. 0., 307 U.S. 496, 510 (1939).
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seems clear that it was the intention of the framers of the Four-
teenth Amendment to extend to freedmen those privileges and
immunities of national citizenship that had existed as to all others
from the formation of the federal government, particularly em-
bracing freedom of communication and petition on all topics of
national concern. Given a broader interpretation of the word
"citizen" in the Privileges and Immunities clause, it might well
be the proper vehicle to invalidate state denials of freedom of com-
munication on national affairs. The artificiality, if not the im-
propriety, of transposing the First Amendment, never intended to
be the determinant of state power over freedom of expression, 6
into the Fourteenth should be obvious.
The misguided 5 to 4 majority in the Slaughterhouse Cases of
1873 felt that the "fundamental" rights of free men were yet to be
protected only by the state governments, notwithstanding the
passage of the Fourteenth Amendment. Supposedly they would
have included in the term the rights to worship and to speak and
print on the usual topics of the day. However, it must be under-
stood that even the five judges of the majority admitted that there
existed a national citizenship distinct from state citizenship, 7 one
of the rights and privileges of which was the right to participate
in the affairs of the national government. Readily they recognized
that all rights and privileges "which owe their existence to the
Federal Government, its national character, its Constitution, or
its laws" are capable of being protected by the national Supreme
Court from state invasion." Now surely there existed no "funda-
mental" right, in the sense the judges of the majority used the
term, to petition the national government or to discuss its affairs
prior to its creation. Such rights then, even as to these judges,
owed their existence to the federal government and its national
character and were to be thereafter protected by the national
judiciary. Was there any doubt in the minds of these jurists
that such rights existed? None whatsoever. "The right to peace-
ably assemble and petition for redress of grievances ... are rights
of a citizen guaranteed by the Federal Constitution."
6 "It is now too late to question the correctness of this construction." United
States v. Cruikshank, 23 L. Ed. 588, 591 (1876).
7 16 Wall. 36, 74 (1873).
'id. at 79.
9 ibid.
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The dissenters in the Slaughter-house Cases, Chief Justice
Chase and Justices Field, Swayne and Bradley, were ever more em-
phatic that there was a national right of national citizens to wor-
ship, to speak, to publish, and to assemble, and that invasions of
these rights were to be properly invalidated by the national Court
under the privileges and immunities clause. The privileges of
citizens of the United States, they affirmed, included "the free
exercise of religious worship, the right of free speech and a free
press, the right peaceably to assemble for the discussion of public
measures."' 1° The purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to
make it clear that the states were henceforth not to deny or abridge
these rights and privileges, even as the First Amendment had
made it clear that the national government was not to deny these
rights of free men."
Three years later, in United States v. Cruikshank, it becomes
abundantly clear that the right to assemble and talk on matters of
national concern and the right to petition the national Congress
are rights and privileges inherent in national citizenship. Without
dissent the Court joined with Mr. Chief Justice Waite in pro-
claiming that "The right of the people peaceably to assemble for
the purpose of petitioning Congress for a redress of grievances, or
for anything else connected with the powers or the duties of the
National Government, is an attribute of national citizenship and,
as such, under the protection of and guaranteed by, the United
States. The very idea of a government, republican in form, im-
plies a right on the part of its citizens to meet peaceably for con-
sultation in respect to public affairs and to petition for a redress
of grievances." The Court added: "If it had been alleged in these
counts that the object of the defendants was to prevent a meeting
for such a purpose, the case would have been within the statute,
and within the scope of the sovereignty of the United States.'
2
And as true now as when uttered in 1939 is Mr. Justice Roberts'
observation of the position taken by the Court in the Cruikshank
case, "No expression of a contrary view has even been voiced by
this Court.'1 3
Indeed, in Hague v. C. L 0. decided that year, five of the seven
'Id. at 118.
"Id. at 122.
"92 U. S. 542, 552, 558 (1876).
'Hague v. C. I. 0., 807 U. S. 496, 513 (1939).
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justices participating agreed in assuming that the right of national
citizens to assemble for the discussion of federal laws is a privilege
secured against state interfeernce by the privileges and immuni-
ties clause. "Citizenship of the United States would be little bet-
ter than a name if it did not carry with it the right to discuss
national legislation and the benefits, advantages, and opportuni-
ties to accrue to citizens therefrom," stated Justice Roberts. 4
Even the recent unsatisfactory majority opinion in Collins v.
Hardyman assumed without deciding that assembly to discuss the
merits of the Marshall Plan was a federal right constitutionally
capable of protection through federal legislation.15 Mr. Justice
Burton, speaking in dissent for himself and Justices Black and
Douglas, was clear in recognizing that rights such as those claimed
were "rights which exist apart from the Fourteenth Amend-
ment."'16 "Congress certainly has the power to create a federal
cause of action in favor of persons injured by private individuals
through the abridgment of federal-created constitutional rights."'17
Since the majority decided the case solely on an interpretation-a
fantastically mistaken one, it is suggested-of the civil rights act,
they would "say nothing of the power of Congress to authorize
such civil actions as respondents have commenced or otherwise to
redress such grievances as they assert."' 8
Other federal courts have recognized that freedom of speech
and freedom of assembly, at least on matters of national concern,
are federal rights sufficient to constitutionally permit congressional
punishment, under the civil rights acts, of those who deny such
rights. The Cruikshank concept of federalism was respected and
applied by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit in 1940,19 and three years later the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit went further and held that the national legisla-
ture could constitutionally authorize punishment of those state
officers who denied either freedom of religion or freedom of
"Ibid.
"In the light of the dictum in United States v. Cruikshank, we assume,
without deciding, that the facts pleaded show that defendants did deprive plain-
tiffs 'of having and exercising' a federal right which, provided the defendants
were engaged in a 'conspiracy set forth in this section, would bring the case
within the Act." 841 U. S. 651, 660 (1951).10 341 U. S. 651, 664 (1951).
"Ibid.
3 41 U. S. 651, 662 (1951).
"Powe v. United States, 109 F. 2d 147, 151 (5th Cir. 1940).
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speech, imposing no topical limitation upon the nature of the
communication.20
If, as it thus seems clearly proven, positive federal protective
action is possible under the Fourteenth Amendment, surely the
negative impact of the Amendment is as great and amply adequate
to invalidate any and all state denials of freedom of communica-
tion on matters of national concern. The privileges and immuni-
ties clause, wrote Mr. Justice Bradley for the United States Su-
preme Court in the Civil Rights Cases, "nullifies and makes void
all state legislation, and state action of every kind, which impairs
the Privileges and Immunities of citizens of the United States. '21
II. Judicial cognition of the federal factor in delimiting state
power to abridge freedom of expression.
When it is realized that the first United States Supreme Court
brake upon state abridgment of freedom of expression was not an-
nounced until 1925,22 it is not so amazing that there are but rare,
and relatively recent, judicial acknowledgments of the federal
factor involved in demarcating local competence over freedom of
expression.
Five years before the Court indicated its first limitation upon
state power over expression, Mr. Justice Brandeis in Gilbert v.
Minnesota23 indicated clearly that to him there was a problem of
federalism involved in defining state power to punish certain ut-
terances. Further, he recognized that where the communication
concerned federal matters, such as the defense of the country and
raising armed forces, the lesser political subdivisions had no
power to interfere with or punish such communications. "The
matter," he wrote, "is not one merely of state concern. The state
law (punishing utterances influencing others not to enlist) af-
fects directly the functions of the Federal government. It affects
rights, privileges, and immunities of one who is a citizen of the
United States; and it deprives him of an important part of his
liberty. These are rights which are guaranteed protection by the
Federal Constitution; and they are invaded by the statute in ques-
tion." Where speech, such as this, concerns a matter of national
Catlette v. United States, 132 F. 2d 902 (4th Cir. 1943).
t109 U. S. 1, 11 (1883).
-268 U. S. 652 (1925).M254 U. S. 325, 336-339 (1920) (dissenting).
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policy Congress, alone, can determine when limitations are to be
placed upon communication. "No state," concluded Justice Bran-
deis, "may trench upon its province."
Not at all novel was the thought that certain activities were
crimes only against the national government and no concern of
the states. In discharging an accused from an indictment for
treason against the State of New York, the state Supreme Court
stated in 1814: "The subjects of Great Britain are the enemies of
the United States of America, and the citizens thereof, as members
of the Union, and not of the State of New York, as laid in the in-
dictment. '24 There were other holdings that treason against the
United States was not a proper subject of state criminal law.2 5
And, two years prior to the Gilbert case, when a municipal
corporation by resolution sought to prohibit the circulation of a
German language newspaper, enforcement of the resolution was
enjoined by Vice Chancellor Lane of New Jersey who stated:
"There can be no justification for the passage of the resolution as
a war measure. That is to be dealt with by the national authori-
ties, and not by the local authorities. 26
In 1940, in the first case protecting freedom of religion from
state inroads, Mr. Justice Roberts saw that there was a problem of
federalism involved, a clash of local with national interests as
acute as in any commerce clause case. "Decision as to the lawful-
ness of the conviction," he stated, "demands the weighing of two
conflicting interests. The fundamental law declares the interest
of the United States that the free exercise of religion be not pro-
hibited and that freedom to communicate information and
opinion be not abridged. The state of Connecticut has an obvious
interest in the preservation and protection of peace and good
order within her borders." Then, Justice Roberts continues, not-
ing clearly the paramount national interest in protecting rights of
national citizenship: "We must determine whether the alleged
protection of the State's interest, means to which end would, in
the absence of limitation by the federal Constitution, lie wholly
within the State's discretion, has been pressed, in this instance, to
' People v. Lynch et al., 11 Johns. 549 (N.Y. 1814).
' Ex parte Quarrier, 2 W. Va. 569 (1866).
" New Yorker Staats-Zeitung v. Nolan, 105 Ad. 72, 73 (Ct. Chancery, N. J.
1918).
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a point where it has come into fatal collision with the overriding
interest protected by the federal compact."2 7
The same year, in invalidating a state ban upon peaceful
picketing, the Court, through Mr. Justice Murphy, noted that
the subject of the communication did not make for state control.
"The merest glance at State and Federal legislation on the subject
demonstrates," he said, "the force of the argument that labor
relations are not matters of merely local or private concern." 2
In the Bridges case, both the state supreme court2 9 and the
United States Supreme Court recognized that sending a telegram
to the Secretary of Labor denouncing as "outrageous" a decision
of a state court judge in a labor dispute and asking federal aid
was an exercise of "the right of petition to a duly accredited repre-
sentative of the United States government, a right protected by
the First Amendment. ' 3 0
And in the Chaplinsky case, as the Court exposed to state pun-
ishment those who utter "the lewd and obscene, the profane, the
libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting' words", it explained that
"There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of
speech, the prevention and punishment of which has never been
thought to raise any constitutional problem." 31 Why is there
deemed to be no federal constitutional problem? Although not
lucidly articulated, it appears to be because the solution of prob-
lems facing the nation is only remotely, if at all, aided by such
utterances. Similarly suggestive that only comments contributing
to the rational resolution of national issues are protected against
state inroads by the federal Constitution is the language of the
Court in the Cantwell case: "Resort to epithets or personal abuse
is not in any proper sense communication of information or
opinion safeguarded by the Constitution, and its punishment
would raise no question under that instrument."32
There is evidence, too, in both the Barnette and Taylor flag
salute cases that the Supreme Court had in mind that inculcating
reverence for "the national emblem"33 was hardly the primary re-
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 807 (1940).
uThornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 103 (1940).
Bridges v. Superior Court, 14 Cal. 2d 493, 94 P. 2d 983 (1941).
'Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252, 277 (1941).
tmChaplinsky v. State of New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568, 571-2 (1942).
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 307, 309-310 (1940).
'Taylor v. Mississippi, 319 U. S. 583, 589 (1943); West Virginia Board of
Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624 (1943).
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sponsibility of the local governments. Reference by the Court to
practices thought proper and adequate by the federal congress is
revealing. 34
But the Supreme Court's most direct announcement of the
federal factor in freedom and its attendant need for dual standards
of competence came in 1952 from Mr. Justice Jackson. "The in-
appropriateness of a single standard for restricting State and Na-
tion," he suggests, "is indicated by the disparity between their
functions and duties in relation to those freedoms." 35 There are
certain utterances, the Justice suggests, that are no concern of the
federal government. "Criminality of defamation," he notes, "is
predicated upon power either to protect the private right to enjoy
integrity of reputation or the public right to tranquility. Neither
of these are objects of federal cognizance. .".. -31 Implicitly he ad-
mits that there are certain communications that are no concern of
the states. It is only unfortunate that the Justice did not carry his
thinking the necessary step further to a recognition that the test
of federalism is not the power involved, but the subject-matter of
the communication. This the Cruikshank court saw clearly, and
this Justice Brandeis detected was the distinction to be kept in
mind. That a state has the admitted power to preserve the public
morals does not in any way resolve the question of its power to
limit freedom of communication by the censorship, let us say, of
telecast newsreels. After all, whether state power exists is the con-
stitutional question to be determined. It is hardly proper to as-
sume the answer.
It is not Justice Jackson's present37 view that the First Amend-
ment is not binding upon the states that is the source of his in-
adequate solution. He would, one must assume, posit federal
protection of individual freedom of expression upon the "liberty"
of the Fourteenth Amendment, perhaps even upon the privileges
and immunities clause of that Amendment. This is, of course, the
proper approach to the problem so long, and only so long, as one
can see the incongruity of interpreting liberty and privilege in
terms of state "powers." "Liberty" and "privileges" of national
'West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 638 (1943).
' Beauharnais v. Ilinois, 343 U. S. 250, 294 (1952).
Ibid.
' Compare West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624,
639 ff. (1943).
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citizens set forth in a national constitution mean only one thing:
what privileges and what liberty in relation to the successful
functioning of the national government must necessarily be pro-
tected so that national citizenship is not a sham but a significant
reality. This, it should be clear, demands a topical analysis of the
communication or petition involved. No inquiry into claimed
state powers allegedly needed to protect the local community is at
all relevant to the task.
Resolution of the problem of federalism has most of all cen-
tered in American constitutional law around the competence of
the states to regulate interstate commerce. Under the "Cooley
Compromise,"38 state regulation of such commerce is only pos-
sible when the matter is of "local" concern, and it has never been
suspected that when the problem was "national" or demanding of
uniform treatment that there was any room for state interference
with interstate commerce. Where the subject of state interference
is freedom of communication on matters of national legislation,
it is obvious that there is here no "local" problem and no room for
state abridgment of freedom of expression even under tests of
federalism such as this, admittedly solicitous of state power. And
the United States Supreme Court has at times in commerce cases
applied theories even more restrictive of state power: the negation
of state power from the silence of Congress;3 9 the denial of state
power consequent to the occupation of the field by Congress.40
Of course, under the supremacy clause of the United States Con-
stitution,41 and its counterpart in the Australian Constitution,4
there is no room for state interference with any exercised federal
power in the event of conflict;43 and on a number of occasions the
United States Supreme Court has denied the states power to
duplicate exercised federal powers.44 Now, very similar theories
" Cooley v. Port Wardens of Philadelphia, 12 How. 299 (1851).
" Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District, 120 U. S. 489, 493 (1887);
Wabash Ry. v. Illinois, 118 U. S. 557 (1886); Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1,
222 (U. S. 1824).
, Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U. S. 148 (1942).1 Art. VI, clause 2.
"Section 109.
" Southern By. v. Reid, 222 U. S. 424 (1912). Conflict with federal "policy"
has even, on occasion, been held sufficient to invalidate state legislation. Hill v.
Florida ex rel. Watson, 325 U. S. 538 (1945).
" "When Congress has taken the particular subject-matter in hand coinci-
dence is as ineffective as opposition.. .. " Charleston & W. C. Ry. v. Varnville
Furniture Co., 237 U. S. 597, 604 (1915).
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underlie many judicial decisions demarcating state competence to
abridge freedom, indicating an awareness of the problem of fed-
eralism involved. In Hines v. Davidowitz,45 for instance, it was
argued to the Supreme Court that the power of Congress to regu-
late the activities of aliens while within the country was exclusive
and brooked no state complementation. This, however, the Court
left unanswered as it invalidated Pennsylvania's alien registration
act because the local law stood as an obstacle to the occomplish-
ment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Con-
gress. Other courts, it should be noted, have honored the argu-
ment that federal power over aliens, at least as to their associa-
tions, registration, and communications, while in this country, is
exclusive.46 And it is interesting to note the Court's view that
when human rights are involved congressional occupation of the
field is to be found more readily than in the commerce cases.47
A three-judge federal court has recently denied an injunction
to restrain enforcement of Michigan's Communist Registration
Act. The two judges of the majority were willing to apply the
test of the Hines case but found no Congressional intent to deny
a state law requiring registration of Communists and "communist
front organizations" and individual members thereof. District
Judge Levin dissented "because it invades a field pre-empted by
Congress and because it denies due process of law as guaranteed
by the Fourteenth Amendment." 48 Judge Levin appropriately ob-
serves: "It must readily be apparent that this legislation-par-
ticularly if multiplied forty-eight times-could seriously embar-
rass the Federal Government in a peculiarly sensitive international
area."49 And he makes a further pertinent distinction between the
state act and the federal Internal Security Act of 1950 in that the
latter is much more solicitous of individual rights than the Michi-
gan Act, the federal enactment affording administrative hearings
and even judicial review before the registration provisions become
applicable to organizations and individuals. The United States
'312 U. S. 52 (1941).
" Ex parte Ah Cue, 101 Cal. 197, 35 Pac. 556 (1894); Arrowsmith v.
Voorhies, 55 F. 2d 310 (E.D. Mich. 1931).
' Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 68 (1941). The Court has at times
indicated that the intent to occupy the field in commerce cases must be clear.
People of California v. Zook, 336 U. S. 725, 733 (1949).
"Albertson v. Millard, 106 F. Supp. 635, 647 (E.D. Mich. 1952) noted in
66 HAnv. L. REv. 327 (1952).
49 Id. at 648.
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Supreme Court has since held the suit was prematurely brought
in the federal courts since the statute had not yet been interpreted
by the Michigan courts.50
And there are other areas of freedom of communication in
which courts and scholars, realizing that there is no justification
for state abridgment, have denied any state competence under
theories of federal supremacy once Congress has exercised a recog-
nized power. At the time of the first World War Zechariah Chafee
indicated that state prosecution for utterances allegedly inter-
fering with the war effort "seems like one of the cases where the
state government has at the most a concurrent power with that
of Congress, which must cease to operate when Congress has de-
termined the proper laws to apply to the subject-matter." 51 And
federal occupation of the field may readily invalidate state labor
laws abridging the freedom of communication of workers.52 Note,
too, how federal occupation of the field resulted in judicial an-
nulment of Pennsylvania's attempt to interfere with freedom of
communication by the censorship of telecasts. "We think it is
clear," said the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, "that Congress has occupied fully the field of television
regulation and that that field is no longer open to the States."' 3
Application of theories such as national pre-emption of the field
are inevitably premised upon the conclusion that there is involved
a matter of national concern, a subject capable of regulation by
the federal Congress. If this is so, is it better to deny state power
to abridge freedom of expression on national laws and national
concerns through the application of a topical test, rather than to
encourage courts in the delightful but disturbing game of guessing
at congressional intent to occupy some "field"?
Recall, too, International Text-book Co. v. Pigg,54 in effect
holding that a state can not abridge the right of national concerns
to send intelligence in and out of the state, and then ask by what
logic and common sense the same political unit can suppress and
punish utterances on matters of national concern, even when
uttered within the state by citizens of other states. Or look at the
- 345 U. S. 242 (1953).
'Freedom of Speech (1920) 112.
International Union, C. I. 0. v. O'Brien, 339 U. S. 454 (1950).
SDuMont Labs v. Carroll, 184 F. 2d 153, 156 (3rd Cir. 1950), certiorari
denied, 340 U. S. 929 (1951).
'217 U. S. 91 (1910).
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action of a federal court in invalidating, as to a radio station whose
radius extended beyond the state line, a state statute requiring
of all radio stations certificates of public convenience, while re-
fusing to invalidate the statute, apparently on the theory that it
could be constitutional if applied to "purely intrastate" radio
stations, as urged by the state.55 Even if the reach of sound waves
could be measured with exactitude, is this any rational criterion
of the constitutional competency of a state to regulate freedom of
communication? To such results as this are we led by demarcating
state power over freedom of expression by the commerce clause
and the First Amendment.
In ascertaining the proper power of a state to interfere with
freedom of communication, a look into the tested solutions of our
federal neighbor to the north can be most profitable. Although
structural comparisons are admittedly not exactly analogous be-
cause the provinces are not residuaries of power as are our states,
functionally the problem is identical and the Canadian experience
most valuable.
As a result of the British North American Act-in effect
Canada's constitution-and judicial interpretation there is today
no power in the provinces to punish as crimes any claimed
"abuses" of freedom of communication, and there is a great likeli-
hood that even non-criminal interferences with expression, es-
pecially on matters of national concern, will be ruled ultra-vires
the provinces. In 1938 the Supreme Court of Canada invalidated
the Alberta Accurate News and Information Act which required
publshers in that province to publish any statement of the Chair-
man of the Provincial Social Credit Board and further demanded
that publishers divulge information as to the source of particular
articles. In an outstanding opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Duff, the
Court stated that the constitution "contemplates a parliament
working under the influence of public opinion and public dis-
cussion." "There can be no controversy," stated the Chief Justice,
"that such institutions derive their efficacy from the free public
discussion of affairs, from criticism and answer and counter-criti-
cism, from attack upon policy and administration and defense and
counter-attack, from the fullest analysis and examination from
' N. B. C. v. Board of Public Utility Commrs., 25 F. Supp. 761 (D.N.J.
1938). Cf. Sorenson v. Wood, 128 Neb. 348, 243 N.W. 82 (1933), certiorari
denied, 290 U. S. 599 (1938).
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every point of view of political proposals." Then the Chief
Justice added: "Any attempt to abrogate this right of public de-
bate or to suppress the traditional forms of the exercise of the
right (in public meeting and through the press) would, in our
opinion, be incompetent to the legislatures of the provinces, or
to the legislature of any one of the provinces, as repugnant to the
provisions of the British North American Act, by which the Parlia-
ment of Canada is established as the legislative organ of the people
of Canada under the Crown, and Dominion legislation' enacted
pursuant to the legislative authority given by those provisions.
The subject matter of such legislation could not be described as a
provincial matter purely.... ." Chief Justice Duff then concluded:
. . the limit, in our opinion, is reached when the legislation
effects such a curtailment of the right of public discussion as sub-
stantially to interfere with the working of the parliamentary in-
stitutions of Canada." 56
In another opinion in the same case Mr. Justice Cannon
added: "The province cannot interfere with his status as a Ca-
nadian citizen and his fundamental right to express freely his un-
tramelled opinion about government policies and discuss matters
of public concern. The mandatory and prohibitory provisions of
the Press Bill are, in my opinion, ultra vires of the provincial
legislature. They interfere with the free working of the political
organization of the Dominion. They have a tendency to nullify
the political rights of the inhabitants of Alberta, as citizens of
Canada, and cannot be considered as dealing with matters purely
private and local in that province. The federal parliament is the
sole authority to curtail, if deemed expedient and in the public
interest, the freedom of the press in discussing public affairs and
the equal rights in that respect of all citizens throughout the
Dominion." "No province," concludes Justice Cannon, "has the
power to reduce in that province the political rights of its citizens
as compared with those enjoyed by the citizens of other provinces
of Canada. Moreover, citizens outside the province of Alberta
have a vital interest in having full information and comment,
favourable and unfavourable, regarding the policy of the Alberta
government and concerning events in that province which would,
' In the Matter of Three Bills passed by the Legislative Assembly of the
Province of Alberta, (1938) Can. L. Rep. 100, 183-134.
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in the ordinary course, be the subject of Alberta newspapers' news
items and articles. 57
Thus it can be seen clearly that the Canadian Supreme Court
recognizes a national citizenship, full federal power to protect
freedom of communication, and most importantly, an absolute
want of power on the part of the provinces to criminally punish
certain expressions and utterances. Note from both the opinions
the right of the individual citizen of the Dominion, appreciated
fully by the high tribunal even in the absence of a specific con-
stitutional bill of rights; the interests of citizens resident in other
provinces; the clash of local and national interests and the su-
premacy of the latter. Of the greatest instructive value to us is
the topical criterion of communications insulated from local
abridgment. Immune from local interference are all those ex-
pressions which concern "the working of the parliamentary in-
stitutions of Canada." Where the communications pertain to mat-
ters national rather than local-where they relate not only to the
institutions of the national government but to its role and re-
sponsibilities as a national government-then the lesser political
subdivisions of a federal state have no constitutional capacity to
interfere with such speech, publication or assembly.
Referring to the Press Bill decision, a competent Canadian
scholar writes: "The Supreme Court of Canada has held speci-
fically that it is beyond the power of provincial legislatures to re-
strict the freedom of the press and that any such restriction is a
matter solely for the Dominion Parliament." And it seems to
this author that he is sound in adding: "Presumably, the reasoning
of the Court applies to the other essential civil liberties as well
and it is doubtful how far these fall at all within the ambit of
provincial authority set out in section 92 of the British North
American Act."58
The following year the test of national concern was applied by
Mr. Chief Justice Greenshields of the Superior Court of Quebec
in sustaining a provincial act making illegal the use of property
for the propagation of communism. It was sustained, according
to the Court, since it created no interference with the working of
the parliamentary institutions of Canada. The users of the prop-
, Id. at 146.
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erty could anywhere else talk, publish and assemble to their
hearts' content on the merits of marxism. "I fail to find in the
statute any interference with freedom of speech. . ." noted the
Justice. "So far as the record shows, the question of freedom of
the press does not present itself for consideration in the present
case .... Criticism and discussion are not in any way interfered
with . ... I'D
Valuable, too, for a clarification of the role of the province
in interfering with freedom of expression is Attorney-General for
Ontario v. Koynok, decided by the Supreme Court of Ontario in
1941.110 Here the Court denied the power of the attorney general,
on behalf of the province, to restrain the publication of literature
allegedly obscene. "The protection of public morals is not a mat-
ter of local or private nature," said the tribunal. 6' This is abun-
dant affirmation of the proposition that communication protected
from provincial interference need not be addressed to pending
legislation before the Dominion Parliament. So long as the publi-
cation or the speech is not "local" or "private" then there is no
competence in the provincial governments to deny or abridge
freedom of expression.
III. Conclusion
To this, then, are we led. First, that the individual and
national interests in freedom of communication are to be pro-
tected from state abridgment under the Fourteenth Amendment,
with no transposition there-into of the First and with no sug-
gestion that the same criterion applies to both the states and the
federal government. Secondly, that the only satisfactory standard
of state competence over communication in a federal republic is a
topical one, denying to the states, in the absence of congressional
consent, all competence to abridge that freedom of expression re-
lating to national laws and national affairs. Thirdly, that if ex-
perience should indicate a need for local interference with such
communications, the advisable solution is to have the national
legislature, as in interstate commerce situations, consent to specific
state controls.
"Fineberg v. Taub, 73 Can. C. C. 37, 48 (1939), (1940) 1 D. L. R. 114,
77 Que. S. C. 233.
®75 Can. C. C. 100 (1940), (1941) 1 D. L. 1R. 548, (1940) 0. W. N. 555
(Judgment set aside on appeal on other grounds).
"Id. at 75 Can. C. C. 107.
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Within the Fourteenth Amendment utilization of the privi-
leges and immunities clause for the present task is undoubtedly
historically more accurate and, indeed, superficially attractive.
The privilege of discussing matters of import to the nation is a
privilege of national citizenship and, as such, applicable to the
individual citizen. Use of this clause would, in the light of present
judicial interpretation, deny to artificial persons freedom of com-
munication. Now, notwithstanding that learned judges have
claimed that the "liberty" of the due process clause should prop-
erly be confined to natural persons,62 it is today fairly well settled
that corporations and associations are protected under this clause
in its "absorbtion" of the First Amendment and hence entitled to
freedom of communication. 63 Since a corporate publisher or radio
station can, fully as well as any individual citizen, put into the
market place of thought ideas national in character, proper in-
terpretation of a topical test of local competence necessarily ex-
tends freedom of expression protection to all persons, natural and
corporate. Therefore, under present interpretation of the privi-
leges and immunities clause, the due process clause of the Four-
teenth seems the constitutional measure under which state com-
petence over freedom of communication shall be demarcated.
The question may well be asked: under a topical test of fed-
eralism is there to be no power in a state or municipal corpora-
tion to prevent one with a communicable disease from distributing
handbills dealing with a proposed federal law? At first glance it
seems as though freedom of communication might well bow be-
fore the local area's interest in protecting its health. Recall the
observation of Mr. Justice Black in Martin v. Struthers, "No one
supposes ... that a city need permit a man with a communicable
disease to distribute leaflets on the streets or to homes .... -14
However, observe that federal Canada has functioned well with
little, if any, more disease than ourselves, under its complete
denial of provincial competence to interfere by criminal laws with
"The liberty referred to in that Amendment is the liberty of natural, not
artificial, persons." Harlan, J., in Northwestern Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U. S.
248, 255 (1906). For similar statements see: Western Turf Assn. v. Greenberg,
204 U. S. 359, 368 (1907) (Harlan J.); Hague V.- C. I. 0., 807 U. S. 496, 527
(Stone, C. J.); Connecticut Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U. S. 77, 83-90 (1938)
(Black, J., dissenting).
SGrosiean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 283 (1936).
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freedom of communication on parliamentary concerns. Further-
more, if there is a legitimate local interest in need of protection,
as there may well be here, experience under the commerce clause
where the federal government possesses plenary powers abun-
dantly illustrates that states' rights can be adequately protected
by the legislative branch of the federal government. Delegation
by the federal Congress of specific controls to local authorities is,
in freedom of communication equally as in freedom of commerce,
the answer to the protection of legitimate local concerns.
Again it might be asked: under the application of a federal
topical test will all communications other than those relating to
federal legislation or the institutions of the federal government
be at the mercy of state legislatures and municipal councils? To
make the inquiry specific, will such a standard permit local units
to regulate without limitation the exercises of freedom of religion?
Absent the survival of any local gods it can hardly be thought
that one's relations with his Maker are solely or even primarily
"local" matters. And, so, the proper interpretation of a topical
standard will afford adequate protection to all utterances pri-
marily of national, rather than local, concern. It could hardly be
that local control over distributors of tracts on economic matters
would, in these days of international economics, be any more ex-
tensive than at present. And one may conjecture that state censor-
ship of television, radio or the films might have more apparent
constitutional difficulties under a test of federalism. Note, too,
how the Supreme Court of Ontario concluded that the handling
of allegedly obscene literature is a problem for national, rather
than local, authorities. Just as the view in the Dominion seems
to be that their topical test of federalism protects all the funda-
mental freedoms, 65 so should we have every assurance that prop-
erly interpreting such a standard the judiciary here will consider
themselves no lesser guardians of freedom of religion, speech,
press and assembly than at present.
But, just as the United States Supreme Court was reluctant
in the Slaughter House Cases to specify the national privileges and
immunities, so does it hardly seem desirable to here attempt to
indicate all communications in which the judiciary will detect an
overwhelming national concern. As elsewhere in constitutional
Supra note 58.
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adjudication, the process of judicial inclusion and exclusion will
be adequate, so long as the problem of delineating state com-
petence to abridge freedom of expression is seen as one of fed-
eralism and approached with an intelligent inquiry into the
breadth of significance of the utterance. Under this or any other
standard, in a constitutional federal state that has enshrined its
belief in the fundamental right of free men to freedom of ex-
pression, as the United States Supreme Court has already indi-
cated, "the power of a state to abridge freedom of speech and as-
sembly is the exception rather than the rule."60
As unfortunate as is the "commercial" test indulged in from
time to time by the present Court,67 it is abundant proof that a
topical test can be administered by the judiciary. If it is deemed
part of the judicial job to see if a pamphlet is predominantly
"commercial" rather than religious, economic, political, philo-
sophical or something else, surely the same judiciary can make as
intelligent a determination of the "local" nature of a communica-
tion. That a handbill relates to the merits of the Marshal Plan is
no more difficult of detection than that it relates to the merits of
a submarine. 68
Will adoption of a topical test of federalism as the standard of
state competence to abridge freedom of expression automatically
produce constitutionally and socially desirable results? Of course
not. This is not an area in which any hard and fast "test" is serv-
iceable. Better than existent criteria, however, a topical standard
of federalism will direct the attention of those who judge to the
underlying bases for protecting the national right of communica-
tion flowing from national citizenship and enshrined in a national
constitution. To the judicial pragmatist it is a call to a more
realistic understanding of what communication is necessary to the
successful functioning of a national government in a federal state.
To other disciples of Jhering it is a more powerful demand for an
open and improved judicial weighing of the opposed interests, in-
dividual and state, state and nation. To the natural lawyer it
facilitates a better appreciation of the natural rights of man in
the largest political entity he can fashion.
Hemdon v. Lowry, 801 U. S. 242, 258 (1937).
e Extended evaluation and criticism of the "test" is available in Antieau,judicial Delimitation of the First Amendment Freedoms, 34 MAnQ. L. REv. 57(1950).
'Involved in Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U. S. 52 (1942).
